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The Rule of Law Through Its Economies of




The global reach of international law is now becoming relevant to the
micromanagement of daily life. In postcolonial African states, everyday
actions and their meanings are being opened up by the expansion of
national jurisdiction into international jurisdiction. In relation to these
changing technologies of managing shifting regimes of power, this article
explores the ways that the spectacle of the rule of law is linked to the
spectacle of capitalism. By examining the workings of victim and witness
testimonies in the Special Court of Sierra Leone, I examine the ways that
spectacles of law and articulations of suffering displace the realities of
root causes of violence and the ways that these spectacles parse criminal
responsibility. From rebel leaders spreading violence to the plunder of
natural resources to child soldiers at once both victims and perpetrators,
I detail the discursive crafting of the 'African warlord" and the
consequent specter of the victim by showing how law and justice are
anchored in processes and concepts that often mask their normative
underpinnings. Through its focus on victims' justice and not on the
consumerism that fuels production, the Special Court of Sierra Leone
serves not only as the author of new legal tenets of criminal
responsibility, but also as a key mechanism of power through which the
law obscures the conditions that affect its making. As such, like other
spectacles of power, the law is able to make its labor invisible, while
displacing human action and replacing it with spectacular performances
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that affirm the rule of law that gains its force. It obscures its making not
just through the staging and performances of rites, but also through the
narrative strategies that consolidate an affective regime of suffering
within which contemporary humanitarianism gains its power.
INTRODUCTION
Today, international tribunals have become mechanisms for "one of
the most radical types of politicization:" one that produces a visual
domain for the global consumption of rule of law spectacles.' The
unfolding regime of international criminal justice represents a terrain
within which the supranational domain is brought into being in mostly
national contexts through decisions on how to name crimes and
determinations of who is responsible for the consequent violence (and
thus punishable), and on what terms.2 But the supranational tribunal is
an innovation in the contemporary present. In thinking about its
attempts to consolidate power, we need to think about how power works
through spectacle. A range of scholars have addressed the question of
spectacle in different ways-from Plato on knowledge and its
representation,3 to the literature on the spectacle as theatre and
artifice,4 to writings on the spectacle of the state,5 or the postcolonial
state and the banality of power.6 These studies have all been concerned
with the ways that power is actualized in everyday spectacles. For
instance, in The King's Two Bodies, Ernst Kantorowicz examined
spectacles of governance by focusing on how jurists created the
1. KAMARI MAXINE CLARKE, FICTIONS OF JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT AND THE CHALLENGE OF LEGAL PLURALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 94 (2009)
(hereinafter CLARKE, FICTIONS].
2. See Mahmood Mamdani, The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency,
LONDON REV. BOOKS, Mar. 8, 2007, at 1, 5-8 (discussing the debate over classification of
events in Darfur as genocide, investigating the words used to describe the situation, and
arguing that, in the case of Darfur, "[i]t seems that genocide has become a label to be
stuck on your own worst enemy, a perverse version of the Nobel Prize, part of a rhetorical
arsenal that helps you vilify your adversaries while ensuring impunity for your allies.")
3. See THEAETETUS BY PLATO (Benjamin Jowett trans., 2006).
4. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF
"SEX" (1993); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
(1977); MARILYN IVY, DISCOURSES OF THE VANISHING: MODERNITY, PHANTASM, JAPAN
(1995); ROSALIND MORRIS, NEW WORLDS FROM FRAGMENTS: FILM, ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE
REPRESENTATION OF NORTHWEST COAST CULTURES (1994).
5. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTz, NEGARA: THE THEATER STATE IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY BALI (1981); ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING'S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN
MEDIAEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1957); MICHAEL TAUSSIG, THE MAGIC OF THE STATE
(1997).
6. See generally ACHILLE MBEMBE, ON THE POSTCOLONY (2001).
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seemingly mystical power of the king.7 Michael Taussig's The Magic of
the State responded by considering how, through its representation, the
state becomes inverted wholes of materialized artifices. 8 In the domain
of the legal spectacle, a large and growing literature on the "show trial,"
as it has been called, has developed over the past decade. For instance,
as a way to understand the performativity of juridical rights to actualize
power, Jean and John Comaroff have explored questions that range
from crime, the law, and its extranational management9 to trials as
media spectacles.10 In the world of international tribunals, scholars of
law see show trials as potentially altering norms of behavior through
the staging of hierarchies and the performance of rites." Yet this
scholarship has fallen short of demonstrating how international trials
are tied to political economies of violence that undergird these realities.
In demonstrating the ways that international courts gain their political
power through their affective power, I detail the way that root economic
causes are displaced and a new politics of suffering is deployed in the
name of humanitarianism.
In early August 2010, celebrity supermodel Naomi Campbell
appeared as a witness before the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)
held at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. The news
coverage was widespread and consistent-in 1997, Charles Taylor, the
former Liberian President, allegedly gave Campbell a gift of "blood
diamonds." Campbell's testimony was seen as potentially critical to the
prosecution's case in establishing the timing of Taylor's possession of
diamonds from Sierra Leone. Thus, the SCSL, the legal body charged
7. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 5.
8. TAUSSIG, supra note 5.
9. See generally John L. Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, Law and Disorder in the
Postcolony: An Introduction, in LAW AND DISORDER IN THE POSTCOLONY 1 (Jean Comaroff
& John L. Comaroff eds., 2006) [hereinafter Comaroff, Law and Disorder]; John L.
Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, Criminal Justice, Cultural Justice: The Limits of Liberalism
and the Pragmatics of Difference in the New South Africa, 31 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 188, 189
(2004) (discussing "the challenge to the state and to the one law of the nation posed by
cultural practices deemed 'dangerous"' in South Africa).
10. See generally Jean and John Comaroff, Criminal Obsessions, After Foucault:
Postcoloniality, Policing, and the Metaphysics of Disorder, 30 CRITICAL INQUIRY 800 (2004)
(investigating South Africa's preoccupation with the mediated representation of law and
order).
11. See generally Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX
PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 1 (2002); Jeremy Peterson, Unpacking Show Trials: Situating the
Trial of Saddam Hussein, 48 HARV. INVL L.J. 257 (2007).
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with overseeing Taylor's case, issued a subpoena for Campbell (as well
as a number of her colleagues) to appear before the Court.
The prosecution argued that Taylor exchanged blood diamonds for
weapons, arming Sierra Leonean rebels (members of the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF)) and enabling them to undertake brutal attacks
against innocent civilians. The defense maintained that Taylor, as the
sitting president of Liberia at the time, was not connected to the
atrocities committed by the rebels. In the end, the Campbell-Taylor
story attracted popular attention to the trial and exemplified a range of
stereotypes about "African warlords" and their worldly exploits, as well
as a troubling distance between those who kill and those whose
consumption feeds the cycle of profit pursued by those who kill.12 What
remained uncovered by the press was the politics of those supply chain
linkages. Although the case has been presented as focusing on Charles
Taylor's criminal responsibility, at the heart of Campbell's testimony
was the link between diamonds possibly illicitly procured and their legal
consumption on the global market. This link highlights the relevance of
the supply chain for mass atrocities-from violent killing fields to
Hollywood celebrities and young brides-and the power of the capitalist
imagination to transform meanings of value. The recipients of diamond
gifts and the consumers who purchase them without regard for their
origins are the unintentional enablers of violence, operating within
what Anna Tsing has called the "economy of appearances"-a term she
used to describe the dramatization of dreams that attracts investors.13
In other words, the appearance of a successful profit-making enterprise
must be created to convince potential investors to provide financial
capital for an investment-oriented venture or simply stated-"profit
must be imagined before it can be extracted."14
Tsing argues that economic performance and dramatic performance
are linked to draw in an investment frenzy, as evidenced by the advent
of Indonesian mining products, such as the Bre-X minerals and gold.
"The more spectacular the conjuring [of a possible return on
investments], the more possible an investment frenzy."15 In the case of
blood diamonds, it is the dramatization of the triumph of the rule of law
through the spectacle of "the court," and "the perpetrators" that it
houses that is central to the economy of appearances. International
courts, such as the SCSL, are part of a set of performances staged to
12. See Philippe Le Billon, The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed
Conflicts, 20 POL. GEOGRAPHY 561 (2001).
13. Anna Tsing, Inside the Economy of Appearances, 12 PUB. CULTURE 115, 118 (2000).
14. Id.
15. Id.
THE RULE OF LAW THROUGH ITS ECONOMIES OF APPEARANCES 11
dramatize the authority of the rule of law.16 Judicial activities produce
the regulating power of extranational institutions through which the
spectacle of the warlord is key to providing the moral legitimacy of its
work.' 7 The investors are those who invest their money and time to
raise donor funds that contribute to the work of courts. Importantly, the
SCSL is funded through voluntary contributions from governments from
over forty countries, including Canada, Nigeria, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.' 8 This makes it the first
international criminal tribunal with that record.
The moral authority of the court is also important in its economy of
appearances through pursuit of "justice for victims."' 9 Charles Taylor,
the alleged warlord, has been assigned responsibility for commanding
the murder and rape of men and women and boys and girls, as well as
the plundering of African resources. The trial provided a spectacle of
two sides at war for public consumption-the prosecution and the
defense attorneys struggling over evidentiary questions linking one
man, acting as a commander, to the atrocities of many. Even more
importantly, and the focus of this article, is the way that the new
international justice regime draws its moral power not only from the
assignment of guilt to the warlord, but also from the victims of war-
limbless amputees, raped girls with babies, drug-addicted child
soldiers-who are all part of our collective imagination and whose
presence is critical to supporting the spectacularization of international
justice. The more spectacular the conjuring of the victim, the more
urgent the call to support-morally, fiscally, legally-the rule of law.
Yet, despite the assumption that it is a moral force alone that victims
provide such tribunals, the paradox is that the figure of the victim
sensationalizes the power of international trials and produces an
economy of appearances in the realm of international adjudication. In
this case, the victim is consolidated into the demonization of the African
16. See Le Billon, supra note 12, at 579.
17. See ROBERT CRYER, PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: SELECTIVITY AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW REGIME 131-32 (2005).
18. The Special Court Funding Mechanism, SPECIAL COURT OF SIERRA LEONE,
http://www.sc-sl.org/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2011); Agreement Between the United Nations
and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone, U.N.-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Agreement
between U.N. and Sierra Leone].
19. See generally TIM ALLEN, TRIAL JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
AND THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY (2006); Raquel Aldana-Pindell, In Vindication of
Justiciable Victims' Rights to Truth and Justice for State-Sponsored Crimes, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1399 (2002) (arguing in support of victim-focused prosecution); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victims' Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203 (2006)
(expounding on the victim's rights jurisprudence and the courts that create it).
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perpetrator, a tyrant figure whose actions alone are represented as
legally responsible for the decimation of local populations and are cast
against the backdrop of the resource-rich and endemically violent
"Africa" of the international imagination. Through the systematic
elision of the root causes propelling violence, international criminal law
finds a concrete "Other": a singular perpetrator-a commander directing
mass violence, a warlord-whose agency can be severed only through
external judiciaries, and whose acts of violence are recontextualized
within a new political and moral economy based on victims' justice. 20
The reality of the politicization of the figure of the African warlord is
what makes Naomi Campbell's testimony before the court so
compelling. Campbell represents the best of popular culture and the
cycle of consumer complicity and provides a foil for unraveling the role
of contemporary capitalism in the cycle of criminal responsibility. The
reality of consumer power-the power to buy without guilt, to enable
without scrutiny, to exist without popular recognition-not the warlord,
is actually what is the most fascinating because it is a specter within
society-an apparition that operates without explicit causality. 21 It
exists in an economy of appearances that focuses on the alleged warlord
and not the enabling cycles of production and consumption that sustain
war in the first place.
As addressed below, one of the things that the law also does well is
bury the normative political apparatus through which legal norms are
constructed. Thus an economy of appearances that features the warlord
writ large, rather than the cycle of consumption that feeds the
commodity chain, represents a construct whose social context is
obscured by its attention to perpetrators in the name of victims
everywhere. By examining the ways that law and justice are anchored
in processes and concepts that often mask their normative
underpinnings, this article explores the way that "law obscures the
conditions that affect its making."22 In so doing, it has the power to
20. See Aldana-Pindell, supra note 19, at 1449.
21. See generally IAN BAUCOM, SPECTERS OF THE ATLANTIC: FINANCE CAPITAL,
SLAVERY, AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 121 (2005) (offering that specter explains
"uncanny and reiterative temporality"); JACQUES DERRIDA, SPECTERS OF MARX: THE STATE
OF THE DEBT, THE WORK OF MOURNING, AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 3-5 (Peggy Kamuf
trans., 1994) (defining specter as something that defies final empirical definition).
22. CLARKE, FICTIONS, supra note 1, at 17 (setting forth a similar argument that "[bly
examining the ways that law and justice are anchored in processes and concepts that often
erase their normative underpinnings, this book explores that way that law, whether
funneled through secular or religious mechanisms, obscures the conditions of its making");
see also OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR, RE-DEFINING LEGITIMATE STATEHOOD: INTERNATIONAL
LAw AND STATE FRAGMENTATION IN AFRICA 104-05 (2000) (discussing African states' use of
law to justify violent measures suppressing conquered peoples); MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN
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make its labor invisible, while displacing human action and replacing it
with spectacular performances. These spectacles reinforce the apparent
power of the rule of law to affirm guilt or innocence and to individualize
the violence of many and redirect it onto one individual. In the end,
these spectacles work together with spectacular capitalism to produce
an economy of appearances, that is, the way economies work through
different spectacles to camouflage particular economic processes.
In the court transcripts below, the force of law is made real through
the figure of the victim-a victim to be saved by the rule of law, a victim
around whom collective guilt is made visible and reassigned to those
seen as bearing the most responsibility for mass atrocity. African
victims are central to the processes of international intervention, but
not to the prescribed resolutions. Rather, the figure of the victim exists
as a necessary precondition for imagining the legitimacy of the
international reach of the SCSL. The imagery with which this figure
collaborates is that of the third-world sufferer-the indigent individual,
the defenseless child soldier forced to bear arms, the raped or violated
concubine, the (African, Christian, Muslim, Jewish) refugee, or the
internally displaced. African victimhood is crucial for constructing a
moral obligation to punish the perpetrator in charge. Moreover, as a
consequence of this focus on the perpetrator, the cycles of commodity
chains are rendered insignificant. The possible ellipsis is the often-
violent processes of producing what I refer to elsewhere as "a fiction of
justice"-the creation and codification of a regime of truth that concerns
itself with only some crimes and that celebrates the achievement of
punishment and its symbolic potential to deter future crimes, rather
than addressing some of the contests at the heart of violent struggles. 23
The tribunal has used these newly emergent subject forms ("child
soldier,". "victim," "perpetrator," and "warlord") to transmute spaces for
recuperating the violation of the victim into domains for the legitimacy
of international adjudication. This recuperation, like highlighting the
actions of insurgents, relocates agency from the state to inter- or
supranational agents who, in sub-Saharan African contexts, set new
terms for the management of violence.
The global reach of international law is thus becoming relevant to
the micromanagement of daily life. In postcolonial African states,
everyday actions and their meanings are being opened up by the
RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE 41, 56-64 (2002) (discussing the
constitutionalist approach to human rights, which sees "human rights norms [arising] out
of the liberal tradition, and their application [achieving] a type of a constitutional
system").
23. See CLARKE, FICTIONS, supra note 1, at 20-23 (using the victims to narrativize past
crimes "to incite various types of justice though a range of means').
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expansion of national jurisdiction into international jurisdiction. In the
case of this trial, Taylor has been indicted on a range of charges for
commanding the murder, violent rape, and mutilation of hundreds of
civilians. Taylor is also said to have supported and financed Foda
Sankoh's rebel group, RUF, with the goal of destabilizing Sierra Leone
in order to monopolize access to its diamond resources. His arrest on
March 29, 2006, in Nigeria and his transfer to the SCSL in The Hague
mark the power of international law to enact extradition, as well as to
apply command responsibility internationally. 24
In what follows, I outline the history of the rise and application of
individual criminal responsibility in relation to the development of the
SCSL. I then outline the related production of the African warlord-in
this case Charles Taylor and his victimization of child soldiers-as a
way to demonstrate how, like the spectacle that produced the Naomi
Campbell debacle before the court but buried the political economy of
consumerism, the duality of "victims" and "saviors" are constructed. In
the final section, I examine the creation of the narratives of justice by
examining the ways that subjects are made through particular practices
of narrativization.
I. THE MAKING OF THE RULE OF LAW SPECTACLE: COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITY
One of the leading questions preoccupying studies that address the
rise in international justice institutions, especially in the Global South,
is how to make sense of the shift from truth and reconciliation
commissionS25 to international tribunals. Another question is how to
understand the shift in the assignment of guilt from lower level
violators to commanders who are assigned individual criminal
responsibility managed by international bodies. 26 In relation to these
changing technologies of managing shifting regimes of sovereign power,
I am concerned with the changing notion of the social, that is, extant
notions of subjectivity as they relate to the ways in which these regimes
parse criminal responsibility-the rebel leaders spreading violence to
24. See Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, SPECIAL COURT OF SIERRE LEONE,
http://www.se-sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsCharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx (last visited
Mar. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Taylor Case].
25. Jonathan Allen, Balancing Justice and Social Unity: Political Theory and the Idea
of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 315 (1999); Boaventura De
Sousa Santos, Law and Community: The Changing Nature of State Power in Late
Capitalism, 8 IN'L J. Soc. L. 379, 386-87 (1980).
26. JEAN-FRANQOIS BAYART, STEPHEN ELLis & BkATRICE HIBou, THE CRIMINALIZATION
OF THE STATE IN AFRICA 13-18 (Stephen Ellis trans., 1999).
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plunder natural resources, the consumers enabling violence, and the
child soldiers at once both victims and perpetrators. In this regard,
determining the conditions for victimhood and guilt can be quite
difficult, especially when child soldiers are a part of the terrain of
violence.
In the ten civil wars fought on the African continent in the past
twenty years, a significant amount of the killing was committed by child
soldiers-children trained to kill on command. Children are a
particularly problematic category of criminals for such international
courts because they are seen by some not only as perpetrators of
murder, but also as victims operating under hierarchies of adult
authority and needing rescue by the international justice community.
When the latter leads to the absolution of criminal responsibility for
children under international law, responsibility is reassigned to other
offenders-African adults acting as rebel leaders and high-ranking
commanders. 27 But in order to create the conditions for this
reassignment of guilt, contemporary international legal institutions
such as the ICC28 and the SCSL have operationalized command
responsibility. 29
Command responsibility represents a critical move toward the
individualization of criminal responsibility. Through its popularization,
command responsibility produces a social narrative about vicarious
liability, which is common in many contexts across legal systems. But in
international criminal contexts, it does not displace responsibility for
lower-ranking individuals who also committed crimes and are being
tried in lower courts. Rather, it merely coexists with them, promoting a
narrative in which leaders are internationally held responsible for the
violence enacted by those who serve them. In this regard, a new tenet of
criminal law has emerged, redistributing accountability and redefining
those who bear the responsibility for inflicting suffering, such as
commanders. This initiative has implications both for the international
management and assignment of responsibility for war crimes, and for
the moral economies within which such initiatives are pursued.
There have been two critical moments in the twentieth century
when comparable shifts in the management of criminal responsibility
27. It is worth noting that children-even those over age fifteen-are not, in fact,
under the ICC's jurisdiction: "The Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who
was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of a crime." Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court art. 26, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
28. Bassiouni, supra note 19, at 230.
29. WILLIAM A. ScHABAs, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
83-85 (2001); Chris Allen, Warfare, Endemic Violence & State Collapse in Africa, 26 REV.
AFR. POL. ECON. 367, 371-72 (1999) (highlighting the organization of armed groups and
their commanders).
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took place. The first was the major war trials held in Nuremberg and
Tokyo after World War II. These trials addressed the principle of
individual criminal responsibility for particular violations of
international law applicable in armed conflicts.30 The second moment
occurred with the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions on August
12, 1949, 31 which established a specific framework for the prevention
and punishment of grave crimes, and for the protection of war victims. 32
However, today and over the past twenty years, the majority of armed
conflicts involve civil wars in the Global South, in places such as
Cambodia, Iraq, Sri Lanka, and other countries throughout sub-
Saharan Africa, including Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia,
Uganda, the Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).33
Many of the hostilities in Africa involve struggles to control the plunder
of natural resources and are buttressed by a thriving underground
military economy. 34 Through such conflicts, the twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries have witnessed the widespread militarization of
everyday life, including the production of childhood killing fields.
This state of affairs began at "the close of the Cold War [when] a
growing arms trade began to fuel African conflict zones in which rebel
groups were vying for regional power."35 Throughout the 1990s, in
regions such as Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, the DRC, Rwanda, and
Uganda, conflict resolution found little international support, despite
obvious connections to global trade circuits, resulting in extreme
disparities. In some sub-Saharan African countries, large segments of
the population remained external to health services and wealth
acquisition,36 while a small number remained at the center of new nodes
30. Richard Overy, The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the Making, in FROM
NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1, 2
(Phillipe Sands ed., 2003); Susan Twist, Rethinking Retrospective Criminality in the
Context of War Crimes Trials, 27 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 31, 39 (2006).
31. The four Geneva Conventions and their agreements are as follows: Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
32. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 82 (2d ed. 2001).
33. Henrik Urdal, People v. Malthus: Population Pressure, Environmental Degradation,
and Armed Conflict Revisited, 42 J. PEACE RES. 417, 418 (2005).
34. Allen, supra note 25, at 371. See generally Billon, supra note 12.
35. CLARKE, FICTIONS, supra note 1, at 45.
36. Comaroff, Law and Disorder, supra note 9, at 9-10.
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of power. With power exercised by means ranging from the enforcement
of licit and illicit regulatory mechanisms that protect persons and
property, to the control of economic speculation and investment, to
resource control through military and political forms of brokering,
violence and widespread death were not far behind.37
Experiencing ten civil wars in the past two decades-many rooted in
mineral resource management, ethnic strife, and religious politics-the
African continent is now a key site for the encroachment of a range of
international courts and tribunals presented as the new solution to
Africa's resource wars. Further, the signing of international treaties is
increasingly becoming economically linked to democratic restructuring
mandates. African states, in increasing numbers, have signed and
ratified treaties such as the Rome Statute for the ICC. These shifts
actually lead to the weakening of states' capacities to protect their
borders, manage their populations, and control their markets and
currencies, 38 even as regional competitors strengthen their attempts to
consolidate power for resource control. Indeed, multiple brokers-
including postcolonial state actors in Africa and elsewhere-are vying to
control the terms that constitute the basis for justice. In response,
various ad hoc tribunals have been crafted with the goal of stopping
various nonstate paramilitary actions that result in widespread
violence. Their mantras-"no crimes against humanity should go
unpunished" and "impunity must be stopped"-have come to constitute
the tribunals' moral foundations.
In Sierra Leone, on Africa's west coast, another mechanism of
international justice is under way-adjudication by the SCSL. The
SCSL is a hybrid international court located in Freetown, Sierra Leone,
that deals with investigations of the conflict that occurred in Sierra
Leone from 1991 to 2002.39 During this period, extreme acts of violence
were inflicted on civilians by rebel groups known as the RUF and the
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Widespread violent acts
by these groups included murder, mutilation, amputation, torture, rape,
abduction, and the conscription and use of child soldiers. In 2000, the
United Nations intervened and, with the participation of the Sierra
Leonean government, established the SCSL on January 16, 2002.40 As
37. Id.
38. Thomas Blom Hansen & Finn Stepputat, Introduction, in SOVEREIGN BODIES:
CITIZENS, MIGRANTS, AND STATES IN THE POSTCOLONIAL WORLD 1, 32 (Thomas Blom
Hansen & Finn Stepputat eds., 2005).
39. Though the SCSL is based in Freetown, the trial for Charles Taylor is being heard
at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Taylor Case, supra note 24.
40. Agreement between U.N. and Sierra Leone, supra note 18. Furthermore, U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1315 of August 14, 2000, requested "the Secretary-General to
negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent
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an adjudicatory institution, the SCSL's mandate is to prosecute persons
who bear the greatest responsibility for serious crimes committed since
November 30, 1996. It represents yet another international presence
established to end impunity. The SCSL functions as a new adjudicatory
mechanism for human rights abuses committed during the Sierra Leone
armed conflict, in which the nation's governmental leaders were
implicated in the commission of violent actions of rebel groups.
The SCSL is seen as a human rights body "with teeth,"-that is, a
body with the ability to prosecute crimes. Today, there are four crimes
under the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court: these are violations
of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional
Protocol II (war crimes), crimes against humanity, other serious
violations of international humanitarian law, and crimes under Sierra
Leonean law. 41 As of October 2010, ten individuals have been indicted
on charges of committing crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
other violations of international humanitarian law.42 Only nine
individuals were convicted and are currently in the custody of the SCSL:
Issa Hassan Sesay, Augustine Gbao, Morris Kallon, Moinina Fofana,
Allieu Kondewa, Johnny Paul Koroma,43 Alex Tamba Brima, Ibrahim
Bazzy Kamara, and Santigie Borbor Kanu. 44 The trial against Charles
Taylor was extended on February 8, 2011, thus a judgment has yet to be
reached. 45 The trials have been placed into three groups:46 the Civil
special court consistent with this resolution." S.C. Res. 1315, 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315
(Aug. 14, 2000).
41. The Trial Chamber has the power to impose a lifetime prison sentence upon any
nonjuvenile offender. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone arts. 2-5, 19, Jan. 16,
2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138.
42. For more information on some of these cases, see Case 14: The Prosecutor vs.
Fofana and Kondewa (CDF Case), SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.sc-
sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsFofanaandKondewaCDFCase/tabid/l04/Default.aspx (last
visited Mar. 9, 2011); Case 15: The Prosecutor vs. Sesay, Kallo and Gbao (RUF Case),
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.sc-sL.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsSesay
KallonandGbaoRUFCase/tabid/105/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
43. Johnny Paul Koroma was reported to have been killed in June 2003. As of
September 2008, the Special Court has not been provided with definitive evidence of his
death, and the indictment against him stands. See Prosecutor v. Koroma, Case No. SCSL-
2003-03-1, Indictment (Mar. 7, 2003), http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl/Indictments/SCSL-03-03-
PT%2OKoroma%20Indictment.pdf.
44. There were initially thirteen indictments made; however, the indictments against
Foday Saybana Sankoh (RUF), Sam Bockarie (RUF) and Sam Hinga Norman were
withdrawn upon the deaths of these individuals.
45. See Alpha Sesay, Djd Vu at the Charles Taylor Trial, TRIAL OF CHARLES TAYLOR
(Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.charlestaylortrial.org/2011/02/16/deja-vu-at-the-charles-taylor-
trial/.
46. Taylor's trial stands alone and is being tried in one of the ICC court rooms in The
Hague.
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Defence Forces trial for Fofana and Kondewa started on June 3, 2004,
and concluded, after appeals, on May 28, 2008; the RUF trial for Kallon,
Gbao, and Sesay began on July 5, 2004, and concluded on October 26,
2008; and the AFRC trial for Brima, Kamara, and Kanu began on
March 7, 2005, and concluded, following appeals, on February 22,
2008.47 In the end, Kallon, Gbao, and Sesay were found guilty of war
crimes and crimes against humanity. Kallon and Sesay were each found
guilty on sixteen counts and Gbao was found guilty on fourteen counts.
Charles Taylor's trial represents spectacular performances in which
a new language of responsibility and a new moral economy of
victimhood-the rationale for just intervention-are articulated and
displayed. In their testimonies, witnesses were asked by the prosecutor
to map the chain of association of the perpetrators of violence and thus
to highlight the leaders of the organization. The violence in Sierra
Leone, Liberia, and the Ivory Coast from the early 1990s represents an
example of inquiries into the chain of command. Testimony when the
perpetrator is also the victim, as with the child soldier, illustrates in the
most explicit terms the horror of the specter occurring alongside the
performance of justice as triumph. In these contexts, shadows of
violence-the violence of poverty, the violence of inequality, the violence
of death-exist alongside the dramatic performance of international
justice. Though such testimonies are necessary qualifiers for the
establishment of an injustice, they are not in and of themselves
sufficient to enable the address and arrest of root causes.
In the next section, I demonstrate that this is because of a process
that Susan Harding calls "narrative encapsulation," that is, a
mechanism of narrativization in which one story is "subordinated to and
reframed by the terms of another."4 8 In this case, what could be
encapsulated as a story about political economy becomes subordinate to
a story about African warlords and helping victims through
adjudication.4 9 By showing how the process of narrative encapsulation
works, I show how the rule of law works through the economy of
47. Case 16: The Prosecutor vs. Brima, Kamara, and Kanu (AFRC Case), SPECIAL
COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsBrimaKamaraand
KanuAFRCCase/tabid/106/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2011); Case 14: The
Prosecutor vs. Fofana and Kondewa (CDF Case), SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE,
http://www.se-sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsFofanaandKondewaCDFCasetabid/104/Default.aspx
(last visited Mar. 23, 2011); Case 16: The Prosecutor vs. Sesay, Kallon, and Gbao (RUF
Case), SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/
ProsecutorvsSesayKallonandGbaoRUFCase/tabid/105/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 23,
2011).
48. SUSAN FRIEND HARDING, THE BOOK OF JERRY FALWELL: FUNDAMENTALIST
LANGUAGE AND POLITICS 65 (2000).
49. See id.
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appearances. Here I trace particular witness transcripts from the SCSL
hearings to outline the legal formation of the African warlord in relation
to the making of the victim child soldier. Though I observed some of the
Charles Taylor trial and also read many related transcripts over the
course of my research, the next section focuses specifically on an excerpt
from November 12, 2008, in which a witness, Augustine Mallah,
testifies before the court. His testimony demonstrates the making of
command responsibility and the workings of narrative encapsulation in
which both victim (or witness) and perpetrator categories easily displace
narratives about political economy at the root of the conflict.
II. THE MAKING OF THE SPECTER OF THE VICTIM THROUGH THE AFRICAN
WARLORD
In response to the SCSL prosecutor's questions, Augustine Mallah
describes how he was enlisted into the war in Sierra Leone as a child
soldier and later what the associated chain of linkage was to Taylor.
PROSECUTOR. How did it happen that you were
captured?
AUGUSTINE MALLAH. Well, there was war in our
village and so my family, that is my mother and my
father and my sisters and many others were residing in
the village, that is Jeoma. We were there and one
morning we saw people from Liberia and they entered
into the village, having guns with them, and they
surrounded the village and they told all of us to go to the
court barri and assemble there.
P. You said these people that came to your village with
guns were from Liberia. How did you learn that they
were from Liberia?
AM. That was what they told us and, besides that, even
the way they spoke was different from the way Sierra
Leoneans spoke so we knew that they were from Liberia.
P. You said that they told you they were from Liberia.
What did they tell you?
AM. They told us that they had come from Liberia, that
they were the ones who had brought the war, that Foday
Sankoh had organised and he had told them to bring the
war to Sierra Leone to come and liberate us from what
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we had been suffering from that he did not favour, so he
had come to liberate us.
P. Did they tell you what group they belonged to?
AM. Yes. Some of them said they were RUF fighters
from Liberia.
P. Did you learn the names of any of these people who
came to your village?
AM. C Benjamin, SK Zoro Coin with Augustine Koroma
who was the-he was the Sierra Leonean among them.
Those are the names that I can recall now. There were
many.
P. Mr Witness, when these people came into your village
and took you to the barri, what happened at the barri?
AM. From the time we were all assembled they told us
that-after they had spoken to us they said they had
come to liberate us from the government that was in
power and after they had spoken to us they took me and
some of my sisters and other women who were in the
village, together with men, and they took us out of the
village and went with us.
P. When they were speaking to you at the barri, what
language were they using, if you know?
AM. It was Liberian English.
P. Mr Witness, did you learn if there was any leader
among the people who came to your village?
AM. Yes, ma'am.
P. Who was that?
AM. They said CO SK Zoro Coin.
P. How did you learn he was the leader?
AM. Well, they told us that they were the leaders and he
was the commanding officer.
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P. You said they told you that they were the leaders and
he was the commanding officer. What do you mean when
you say they told you they were the leaders?
AM. Well, what they told us was that Foday Sankoh was
the leader for the war that they had brought to Sierra
Leone, but those who went to our village, they said he
was their commanding officer, he was their commander.
P. You told the Court that after they had gathered you
at the barri they took you and others away. How many
people were taken away?
AM. Well, we were many. We were more than 50, those
of us who were taken out of the village.
P. And what was the gender of those who were taken
away?
AM. Well, first the young ones they told us that they
were going to take us to the base to be trained, together
with some girls. There were some women who were
captured. Those were young women. They took them to
be their wives and that they were going to go with them
to where they were.
P. Now the young ones they were taking for training,
what was the gender of those people? Were they males,
females, or both?
AM. Well, on that day it was only male that were taken
to the base on that day.
P. What were the ages of the males that were taken for
training?
AM. Well, some of them were 10, 11, 14, 20. For me, I
was above 20 years.
P. You said that females were taken as wives. What
were the ages of the females that were taken as wives?
AM. Well, they too-like one of my sisters, she was very
young. She was about 7 to 8. She was going to school.
The other one was about 11 to 12 years old and the
others 15, 16 years, 18 years, most of them.
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P. Your sister that was young and going to school, the
one that you said was 7 or 8, did you ever see her again
after that?
AM. Up to now we don't know where she is.
P. And the sister that was about 11 or 12 years old, did
you ever see her again?
AM. Yes. 50
Here we see an all-too-familiar witness statement, in this case by
Augustine Mallah, narrating his capture. The line of questioning is
directly concerned with the structure of leadership, attempting to
determine the line of command as well as establishing the nature of the
violations by those who committed crimes under the jurisdiction of the
court. The next line of questioning attempts to determine the scope of
the violations. His testimony exemplifies a typical narrative:
P. When you saw your sister again what, if anything, did
she tell you?
AM. Yes. She told us that the very same people who
went to the village, who captured all of us, she said one
of them turned her into his wife. She was with him.
P. Now how was it that you were able to see your
sister-this sister-again?
AM. Well, she was with the man who captured us,
because the man was a Liberian according to what she
told us, but at the time that the Sierra Leone
Government pressurised the RUF fighters in Pujehun
District, that was 1991, the first retreat into Liberia
from Sierra Leone, she hid away from the man and went
into the bush, together with her companions. They were
there up to the time we came around the Soro Gbema
area, Pujehun District. She heard that there were people
in the towns, and people who were in the bush when
they heard that they came out of the bush and so I met
her in one of the villages. That was where I saw her.5'
50. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Transcript, SCSL-2003-01-T, at 200056-60 (Special Court of
Sierra Leone Nov. 12, 2008), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=
zMQ1L6mPccE=&tabid=160.
51. Id. at 20061.
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Mallah then describes the making of child soldiers and the nature of
the force used to ensure the success of that process. Here he describes a
range of violations:
P. Mr Witness, as you were walking from your village
being taken for training, did you try to escape?
AM. No, I did not attempt. I did not attempt escaping.
P. Why not?
AM. Because where they took us to, that is Moala, some
of our brothers attempted to escape. When they were
captured I saw them being killed and dumped into the
river. From there they took us and put us into the
vehicle, so I never thought of such a plan any more from
that point to escape.
AM. When we entered Gisiwulo, they took us to a camp
which they had constructed in the bush by the field.
After they had taken down our names, from me where I
was born and what was the name of my father and my
mother's name and the year of my birth, after they had
taken down all of those details they took me to that bush
and they put me into the house and they told me that
was where I was to be for the training. So, in the
morning they called formation in the field. They said we
were to go there for the training and all of us assembled
there.
P. Mr Witness, who was it who was taking down this
information, your name, your father's name, your place
of birth, your date of birth? Who was doing that?
AM. It was Chico Mayer.
P. Chico Mayer, was this person a male or a female?
AM. A male. He was the training adjutant.
P. Mr Witness, did you learn how it was that Chico
Mayer was there at that training base?
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AM. Yes, he himself told me that he was one of the
Sierra Leonean soldiers who was assigned at the
border-at the Liberian border. Initially when the rebels
entered he was captured but, because they knew that he
had some knowledge in the training and they wanted to
train more people to join the RUF, he was encouraged
and taken to the base to be there as the training
adjutant.
P. You also said that after they had taken all of the
details about you they put you in a house and told you
that was where you would be for the training. This
house, were you alone in that house, or were there other
people in the house with you?
AM. We were many. We were many. It was one platoon.
They said I was to go to the A Company. That was where
the company base was. That was the hut for the
company base. They said I was to be there. We were
many. It was a big booth that was built in the bush.
P. How long were you at this training base for training?
AM. Almost two months.
P. During this two months, did you learn how it was
that the other people in your house came to be there at
the training base?
AM. Yes, all of us were there, just like the way I was
there. Many of us were there and we were undergoing
the same training.
P. While you were at the training base what type of
training did you receive?
AM. Well, they taught me guerrilla training. I
underwent the guerrilla training.
P. And what do you mean when you say guerrilla
training?
AM. Guerrilla training, they said it was a different kind
of training than the military because a guerrilla should
go and fight against the government army and that a
guerrilla is not a national army and if you are a guerrilla
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you are to live in the bush and you should do everything
for yourself in the bush.
P. What sort of things did they teach you?
AM. They taught me how to fight against my enemy,
how to fire arms, how to escape from the enemy.
P. What types of arms did they teach you to fire?
AM. They taught me how to fire AK-47 and they also
told me how to fire RPG and I was taught how to fire
GMG and I was taught how to fire AA, BZT, bazooka,
many.52
Then in an attempt to determine the link between the RUF and
Liberian commanders, like Charles Taylor, the prosecutor asked a line
of questioning making distinctions between the Liberians doing the
training in relation to the Sierra Leoneans:
P. And do you know what group or groups these training
instructors belonged to?
AM. Yes, they were Liberians.
P. And do you know what group they belonged to?
AM. Yes, they said they were NPFL soldiers.
P. Now, you said you were in the house or in a house of a
company and there were beaucoup people in the house
with you. When you underwent this training can you tell
the Court how many people were undergoing the
training at Gisiwulo?
AM. We were more than 1,000.
P. And what was the gender of these people who were
undergoing this training?
AM. They were males, we were in our own camp, and
there were females and they were in their own camp.
P. And the females, if you know, what kind of training
were they receiving?
AM. They too-all of us were undergoing the same
training. They were being taught how to fight, how to
52. Id. at 20063-65.
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manoeuvre from the enemy, how to fire a gun. All of the
trainings that we undertook, they too undertook the
same.
P. What were the ages of the people being trained at
Gisiwulo?
AM. Well, earlier on I told you that some were up to 10
years, some were 11, 14 years, 18 years, 20, 22. That
was it.
P. While you were at this camp for two months, did you
ever refuse to take training?
AM. No, nobody would refuse. In that camp you would
not refuse. Because even those who attempted to escape,
who attempted to escape from the base, when they were
captured they would bring them right in our presence
and they would kill one or two of them just to set an
example, so if somebody said you were not going to train,
you refused being trained and that you were not sick,
they will beat you until you will say, "Well, I will go on-
I will go on the training." They will punish you severely.




AM. Even Foday Sankoh, at a point in time he visited us
there. Then some of the Liberian commanders used to
come there and train us at times for an hour or two
hours and they would return.
P. At the point in time that you were at this camp did
you know who Foday Sankoh was?
AM. Yes, they used to tell us that the war that he had
brought to Sierra Leone, that is those who captured us,
and when we were being trained at the base they said
their leader was Foday Sankoh.
P. You said some Liberian commanders would come to
the camp. Do you remember the names of any of these
commanders?
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AM. One Man One used to go there. CO Baday, used to
go there. CO Mon Ami used to go there. Foday Sankoh
himself went there.53
During the trial, the prosecution spent a significant amount of time
determining how the RUFs guerilla army worked and how it was
coordinated. Shortly after the questions about being enlisted, the
prosecutor asked a range of questions about the coordination of power:
AM. Well, One Man One, what he told us at the base, he
himself, while all of us were in the formation, he said
the war that entered Pujehun District, that he was the
commander for all of the fighters.
P. Did you learn what group he belonged to?
AM. Yes. He said he was an NPFL soldier.
P. Did you learn his nationality?
AM. Yes. He said he was a Gio man.
P. And from what country?
AM. He said Nimba County.
P. Did he tell you what country that is in?
AM. Yes. He said it was Liberia.
P. You mentioned CO Baday. Who was he?
AM. He too was a Gio man. According to CO Baday, he
said One Man One was his elder brother.
P. And did he tell you what group he belonged to?
AM. Yes. He said he too was an NPFL soldier.
P. Did you learn what country he was from?
AM. Yes. He said he was from Liberia. 54
The transcripts are full of details of the command chains, identities,
names, spellings, and roles. Through the narration of a victim who is
able to establish that violations had been committed against him, the
53. Id. at 20067-69.
54. Id. at 20069.
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prosecution then engaged in a line of interrogations about the chain of
command:
P. You said that a person you called CO Mon Ami also
visited the camp. Who was CO Mon Ami?
AM. Well, CO Mon Ami, according to him, he said all of
them came from Liberia. He said they had fought the
Liberian war, together with the NPFL, but that he was
one of the Special Forces from Gambia . . . . So, together
with the Liberians, they were the ones who entered into
Sierra Leone with the war. And that he was one of the
training instructors who used to go and train us at the
base.
P. Train you at what base?
AM. Gisiwulo base.
P. Did he explain to you what he meant when he said he
was a Special Forces?
AM. Yes.
P. What did he tell you?
AM. He said they were the ones who trained together
with Foday Sankoh, Charles Taylor. He said they
trained together, all of them.
P. Now, just to be clear for the record, I would like to go
back to something you said earlier when you were
talking about what was done to people who tried to
escape from the base. On my font it is page 20, 13 to line
20. You said, "They would bring them right in our
presence and they would kill one or two just to set an
example." Who was it who brought them and killed one
or two?
AM. It was the training instructors from Liberians. The
Liberians who used to train us.
P. And you also said, "They will beat you until you will
say, 'Well, I will go on. I will go on training."' Who would
beat you?
AM. The training instructors from Liberia.
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P. Mr Witness, what year was it that you concluded your
training at Gisiwulo?
AM. It was in 1991.
P. After you had been captured and trained, were you
told what group you were now a member of?
AM. They said-yes, they said I was a junior commando
RUF fighter.
P. And after you were trained and became a member of
the RUF, how long did you remain a member of the
RUF?
AM. I was a member right throughout from 1991 right
up to the end of the disarmament.
P. What year was it that the end of the disarmament
occurred, in your experience?
AM. 2002.
P. Now, you mentioned that they told you you were a
junior commando. Did they explain to you what they
meant by junior commando?
AM. Yes.
P. What did they tell you?
AM. They said the RUF had three categories. One was
the Special Forces; that is those who trained together
with Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor, they were the
Special Forces. Those who were captured and trained in
Liberia, they were referred to as the vanguards and they
were the ones who trained us in Sierra Leone ... . .
These hearings depict the particular creation of the child soldier for
the purposes of transferring responsibility to another subject-what is
referred to in legal circles as the "assignment of culpability." The shift
from children as perpetrators to children as victims to be protected was
made possible through the indictment of commanders, such as Charles
Taylor, or Foday Sankoh, Slobodan Milosovic, and Saddam Hussein, in
which the discourse of the rule of law is played out as a triumphant
mechanism of justice. The assignment of culpability, codified in
subsection a of Article 28 of the Rome Statute, imposes individual
55. Id. at 20070-74.
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responsibility on military commanders if they "either knew or, owing to
the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were
committing or about to commit such crimes."56 Subsection 3 of Article 6
of the SCSL Statute lays out the "should have known" standard,57 which
imposes an affirmative duty to remain informed of the activities of
subordinates:
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4
of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate
does not relieve his or her superior of criminal
responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know
that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or
had done so and the superior had failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts
or to punish the perpetrators thereof.5 8
This requirement is a point of contention with lawyers.59 Precedent
for establishing the "knowledge" criterion has been based on two
possible conditions. The first involves whether the commander "knew";
the second is based on whether the commander "had reason to know."
The background for understanding whether a commander "knew" about
the commission of violence refers to actual knowledge, which can be
established either directly or indirectly through circumstantial
evidence. But the meaning of "had reason to know" is often discussed in
the case law in relation to whether a subordinate was about to commit
crimes and the commander failed to take measures to prevent or punish
such acts.
One of the formative influences for establishing principles of
command responsibility in the SCSL Statute came from an ad hoc
tribunal set up by the United Nations on May 25, 1993, to adjudicate
56. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 28, supra note 27.
57. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 6, supra note 41.
58. Id. art. 6(3).
59. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) interpreted
the language of "had reason to know" under Article 7(3) of its Statute of the Tribunal as
requiring the commander to have "had in his possession information of a nature, which at
the least, would put him on notice of the risk of such offences by indicating the need for
additional investigation in order to ascertain whether such crimes were committed or were
about to be committed by his subordinates." Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-A,
Judgment, T 223 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Feb. 20, 2001),
www.icty.org/x/cases/muciclacjuglen/cel-aj010220.pdf. Notably, the Trial Chamber
commented that it made no findings on the present state of customary law, which may
have changed following the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court in 2002. Id. 1 182.
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war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) first considered the scope of
command responsibility in Prosecutor v. Delalid et al., also known as the
Celebi6i case.60 It reached an important conclusion on the knowledge
standard, deciding that commanders have a duty to be "constantly
informed of the way in which their subordinates carry out the tasks
entrusted to them."6 ' In the SCSL, the principles of command
responsibility dictated that commanders were responsible for taking the
necessary measures to fulfill this obligation. In an attempt to fulfill this
knowledge requirement, prosecutorial interests in command
responsibility directed the structure of the proceedings in the Charles
Taylor case.
As an anthropological inquiry, the process of classifying crime and
responsibility in this way redirects attention toward the mechanisms
through which the power of international law gains its force. In this
case, the spectacle of law gains its force not just through the staging of
the hierarchies and the performances of rites within the court, but also
through the micropolitics of legal reasoning and the uses of narrative
encapsulation to produce particular realities. Once command
responsibility was legally established, prosecutors needed only to show
that actual violence was inflicted on particular victims in order to
demonstrate the commission of a crime. The result was the relegation of
suffering and the violence the victims experienced, thus establishing
their condition of victimhood. Witness narratives were narrowly tailored
to explain chains of responsibility through which the prosecution could
articulate a connection between child soldiers and Charles Taylor,
thereby attributing responsibility to him for child-soldier violence
against civilian and military populations. In this process of
incorporation and display of responsibility, the court performed the role
of author. Through its texts, transcripts, images, videos, legal
procedures, and performances, the court institutionalizes victimhood in
mediated ways that are also familiarly racialized as "African." The
victim is then represented through an abhorrent, yet impotent sign of
victimhood that haunts legal proceedings.
The explicit narratives of victim suffering-the discussions of loss
and hunger, the conditions that caused them to kill in the first place,
and the guaranteed consumer demand that enables these cycles-are
taken as secondary. Instead, like a ghost, the details of the violations
are negated, yet still exist as a specter of suffering. This ghostly
presence established via the absence of the victim drives the perceived
60. Id. 11 223, 236.
61. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8
June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 3560 (1987).
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moral economy of judicial interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. Through
the articulation of African victims as the basis for legitimate
engagement, there is a necessary construction of the commanding
perpetrator as a warlord-someone who operates above the law and
whose impunity cannot be allowed to continue. In the quest to abrogate
such practices, the rule of law is deployed strategically, through the
invention and development of a new language of responsibility whose
repercussions are never fully knowable. This is how narrative
encapsulation works-it spectacularizes one reality by renarrativizing
another.
The process of crafting the African warlord and the specter of the
victim demonstrates how the SCSL served not only as the author of new
legal tenets of criminal responsibility, but also as a key mechanism of
power through which the violence of neoliberal moral values and
economic practices spread. In an interview to African Press
International on April 11, 2009, Stephen Rapp, a prosecutor for the
SCSL, explained the rulings against Issa Sesay: "Most importantly they
honor the victims who suffered because of the acts and decisions of these
individuals. The judgment of the trial chamber has helped re-establish
justice and the rule of law in Sierra Leone, without which lasting peace
and development is not possible."62 However, the contemporary
expansion of the rule of law movement and the rise of the defense of the
"victim" reflect various powerful phenomena working in tension with
each other. One such phenomenon involves the way that particular
neoliberal moral values are gaining global traction through the efforts of
governmental and nongovernmental institutions and organizations,
which provide those who have been socially marginalized with spaces
from which to make justice claims.
Another supplemental influence in the current international rule of
law movement is the economic force of neoliberal capitalism. As one of
many policy trajectories within which human exchange and value is
shaped, this form of capitalist strategy has been widespread since the
1970s, when it was imposed on a range of developing countries by
powerful financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.
Neoliberal capitalism has had the effect of deemphasizing governmental
and nongovernmental intervention in national economies and
privileging instead free-market methods that liberate business
operations. Informed by laissez-faire economics and working through
62. Sierra Leone: Rebel leaders get long jail sentences, AFRICAN PRESS INT'L (Apr. 11,
2009, 12:33 AM), http://africanpress.wordpress.com/2009/04/11/sierra-leone-rebel-leaders-
get-long-jail-sentences-his-lawyer-wayne-jordash-described-the-decision-as-the-most-
unfair-result-of-a-trial-that-was-also-unfair-in-the-history-of-international-tribunal/.
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international institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO),
the World Economic Forum, the International Convention on Labor
(ITO), and various free-trade treaty agreements, as opposed to relying
on direct government intervention to apply multilateral political
pressure through labor politics and collective bargaining, neoliberalism
has opened foreign markets to corporate colonization. In doing so, it has
fostered restrictions of economic possibilities in other domains.
Critics have argued that the consequences of this program
throughout sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America include unfair
competition, the erosion of workers' rights,63 and the escalation of
resource-related struggles that are often refracted through religious and
ethnic conflicts.64 In postcolonial African states, neoliberal expansionism
suggests a renewal of an earlier-told narrative: management policies
around export-driven growth developed with the support of global
institutions, including the World Bank, the IMF, and other lending
institutions. The ongoing trend is one in which rich corporate interests
supported by market democracies work alongside international
organizations to shape new economic values and practices in the Global
South.65 These new global economic alliances have made it increasingly
difficult for postcolonial states to maintain economic independence and
63. See, e.g., UGO MATTEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS
ILLEGAL 4 (2008) (arguing that "foreign-imposed privatization laws that facilitate
unconscionable bargains at the expense of the people are vehicles of plunder, not of
legality"); Sandra T. Barnes, Global Flows: Terror, Oil, and Strategic Philanthrophy, AFR.
STUD. REV., Sept. 2005, at 1, 1 (examining "the implications of [American] military and
business initiatives for African nations and the reasons for lack of information about
them"); see also Evelyne Huber & Fred Solt, Successes and Failures of Neoliberalism,
LATIN AM. RES. REV., no. 3, 2004 at 150 (analyzing the successes and failures of neoliberal
reforms in Latin America in order to show that "slow and cautious economic reforms
accompanied by [specific] social policy efforts . . . and deliberate institution-building
strategies" will more firmly establish "growth, stability, the reduction of poverty and
inequality, and improvements of the human capital base" than will a standard set of
neoliberal reforms).
64. See, e.g., Dena Montague, Stolen Goods: Coltan and Conflict in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, SAIS REV., Winter-Spring 2002, at 103 (arguing that the war in the
Democratic Republic of Congo is, in part, a result of international economic investment in
rebel movements, which creates kleptocracy and corruption); Jesse Weaver Shipley,
Introduction, 83 ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 472 (2010) (introducing articles from the issue,
entitled "Ethics of Scale: Relocating Politics after Liberation," examining Jean Comaroffs
book, BODY OF POWER, SPIRIT OF RESISTANCE: THE CULTURE AND HISTORY OF A SOUTH
AFRICAN PEOPLE (1985), and discussing history and culture in postliberation South
Africa).
65. Deborah A. Thomas & Kamari Maxine Clarke, Introduction: Globalization and the
Transformations of Race, in GLOBALIZATION AND RACE: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE
CULTURAL PRODUCTION OF BLACKNESS 1, 8 (Kamari Maxine Clarke & Deborah Thomas
eds., 2006).
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political autonomy, particularly in resource-rich areas.66 Instead, in sub-
Saharan Africa, the response to the changing market has led to
increasing paramilitary contests over resources, furthering
militarization and sectarian violence. The consequences have been
grave. While the economies of trade in ammunition and mineral
resources have found buyers on the global market, they also produced
killing fields in several African regions. 67
In the final section, I discuss the consequences of the new spectacle
of international trials in the consolidation of the image of the black
African body. The African body is conceived as the body to be saved by
humanitarian intervention in such a way that highlights the use of
narrative encapsulations by silencing the political economy at play.
III. HUMANITARIANISM AND THE MORAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONALISM
As spectacles of suffering and narrativization, the truth and
reconciliation commissions of the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries tended to assign victims spaces for narrativizing
devastation,6 8 providing a symbolic possibility for a postviolence
democratic transition.69 In South Africa, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and
Morocco, various forms of truth and reconciliation mechanisms allowed
for the production of discourses on victimhood in which African victims
found ways to narrativize their losses through new vernacular forms.
These forms often incorporate discourses of loss articulated through
global human rights narratives and the integration of particular
indigenous sensibilities, religiosities, cultural styles, and moralities. In
contrast, the SCSL's goal of ending the impunity of commanders
highlights a new relationship with African subjects: one that deploys
the figure of the African victim not for the production of compassion,
forgiveness, or reconciliation, but for the propulsion of a mission of
reassigning responsibility for grave and widespread crimes. At the heart
of this reassignment of the perpetrator are not only contemporary
politics of legitimacy, embedded in a morality of humanitarianism
66. See generally JAMES FERGUSON, GLOBAL SHADOWS: AFRICA IN THE NEOLIBERAL
WORLD ORDER (2006) (collecting a series of the author's essays examining Africa's place in
the world economy, and discussing the historical and social construct of what is considered
"Africa").
67. See Slavoj Ziiek, Against Human Rights, NEw LEFT REV., July-Aug. 2005, at 115,
123-24. See generally Slavoj Ziek, From Politics to Biopolitics . . . and Back, 103 S.
ATLANTIC Q. 501 (2004).
68. RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH
AFRICA: LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE 109 (2001).
69. ERICA CAPLE JAMES, DEMOCRATIC INSECURITIES: VIOLENCE, TRAUMA, AND
INTERVENTION IN HAITI 88-89 (2010).
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highlighting a new moral sociality-in Africa, in particular-, but also a
new set of legal and discursive practices in which narratives of
humanitarian encapsulation are at play. These narratives provide the
makings of a spectacle of the rule of law in which the individual
criminal responsibility reassigned to Taylor reallocates not only the
responsibility of hundreds of killers engaged in economic competition,
but also the responsibility of those whose consumption feeds such cycles
of production.70
The "humanitarian" gesture of "reaching out" for "Africa's benefit" is
of course not new; it has precedents in the history of African colonialism
and the neocolonial humanitarian and development projects. This
reassignment has recast the management of responsibility for some of
the worst forms of contemporary violence to be addressed within the life
of the law. The underlying morality at play generates the moral
fortitude that undergirds the liberal idea of the rights-endowed subject
whose suffering is to be not only acknowledged but rewarded-now
through international intervention and a kind of victim's justice. As in
the case of Charles Taylor, the development of an institutional
infrastructure for the victim-and the drive to protect that category-
propels this new moral economy of extranational intervention as the
new workings of sovereignty.71 The benevolence of the new
internationalism not only reveals some of the most tragic forms of
victimhood, but also, through its mission and justice-seeking goals,
sustains the spectacle of suffering. It is in this spectacle that cycles of
narrative encapsulation continue to promote narratives central to the
mission of legal institutions, rather than promote the re-articulation of
economic narratives.
At the dawn of the rise of international courts, special focus on child
soldiers and preoccupation with African indictments responded to and
exacerbated stereotypes of Africa as politically fragile, legally inept, and
economically volatile. The child-soldier identity serves, in many ways,
as a metonym for childhood, and thus as a spectacle for international
intervention. This paternalism heralds the incorporation of the rule of
law into the continuing history of institutional protectionism, legal and
constitutional intervention, and the management of African resources
by colonial and humanitarian regimes. Through particular adjudicatory
70. See Mariella Pandolfi, Contract of Mutual (In)Difference: Governance and the
Humanitarian Apparatus in Contemporary Albania and Kosovo, IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD., Winter 2003, at 369, 380-81 (2003) (discussing the "do something syndrome," which
is governments' response to public concern about a crisis).
71. Partha Chatterjee, Empire and Nation Revisited: 50 Years After Bandung, 6 INTER-
ASIA CULTURAL STUD. 487, 492 (2005) (recounting how global conditions fueled the
protection of human rights and democratic values from despotic and authoritarian rulers).
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exclusions, such as the vanishing child soldier, narratives of suffering
become secondary to the prosecution of those who are deemed
responsible for crimes under investigation. These processes of ellipsis
are already normative in state criminal trials. In both common law and
canon law criminal cases, victims bear little influence except by way of
offering witness testimony, despite the fact that the rise in power of
international justice institutions is amassed through the claim to
champion the cause of the violated. This claim has been broadcast
through an acute deployment of the imagery of global victims-woman,
African, child, black, brown, Muslim. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa,
the body being defended (and subjugated) is particularly racialized-a
black body whose histories of enslavement, war, famine, militarization,
and economic failure continue to fuel a Western moral imperative of
intervention. The specter of frailty haunts the display of international
justice through the figure of the child soldier-a young body who,
though possessing a complex subjectivity of perpetrator-victim, is split,
abstracted, and recast as defenseless victim. This apparition is central
to international authority, which cannot exist without it because the
moral force of suffering legitimizes its claim. As such, it is more
important than ever to understand the changing nature of the social-
the ways that contemporary law-making and justice-producing domains
gain their power through a new "governmentality" whose power
requires not only the rites staged through legal hierarchies and
performances, but also the spectacle of suffering as the basis for justice.
Two hundred years after the British abolished their slave trade in
1807, it is now the language of "humanitarianism" that embodies the
international discourse around human entitlements to life. Through its
charge to protect human rights, this mode of justice represents the
possibility that victims everywhere, without regard for national
citizenship alliances, are entitled to international inclusion and
protection. This presumption of rights and protections is materializing
alongside the expansion into international domains of the new
biopolitics of the postcolonial state. The biopolitics of the postcolonial
state are enabled by the erosion of state capacities to build a viable
economy for citizens, to command and regulate access to resources in
the domestic economy, 72 and to build innovative judiciary mechanisms
capable of incorporating indigenous cultural traditions through which to
direct future polities. This new internationalized form of governance is
subtler than earlier colonial forms, yet represents a more tragic set of
72. See Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, 15 PUB. CULTURE 11, 33 (Libby Meintjes trans.,
2003).
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realities because of the subtle ways that guilt and power are brought to
bear on contemporary violence.
IV. CONCLUSION-SEEING TRIALS: BEYOND THE EMPIRICISM OF
ADJUDICATION
This analysis began by suggesting that underlying cycles of
consumer demand exist alongside spectacles of war violence. It
demonstrated that when victims or characters of perceived guilt are the
focus, we fail to see the fields of analytic interaction within which they
are operating. Likewise, we fail to see the conditions under which
particular types of displacement were brought into being. These
international trials are a new modality for articulating guilt and
intervening through the language of humanitarianism. These trials
contribute to the creation of victim-specter relationships and these
relationships are diffused in the play of politics and the economy,
creating more violence, which eventually leads to a trial, and so forth. In
order for legal studies to be useful beyond doctrinal classifications and
applications, we need to explore the forms of materiality, as well as
phenomenological constellations of imagination, which simultaneously
shape the spaces between grammars of violence-the core social
realities that explain histories of violence-and the exclusions that
haunt those histories. As I have shown, international institutions work
through the law to craft "victims" and "perpetrators" (or, indeed,
"victim-perpetrators") within the parameters of legal science. These
individuals participate actively in such constructions, yielding new
subjects through which humanitarianism is further legitimatized.
The international management of violence by tribunals intent on
ending the impunity of state leaders has become a privileged solution to
the familiar problem of state complicity in violence. Through a process
of first destabilizing networks of violence through the arrest of high-
ranking leaders and then attempting to vindicate victims through
tribunalization, a new moral economy of justice has developed in which
the international ascension of concerns for the protection of the victim
exists by way of the reassignment of perpetrator guilt. In this new
governmental context, the sign of Africa has come to symbolize the idea
of childhood in the international humanitarian imagination. The child
soldier represents the most oppressed and destitute aspects of
humanity.73 It is through this context that international courts draw
their moral fortitude, their force of law. By exploring the circulation and
application of new "bodies of power" involved in the crafting of African
73. CLARKE, FICTIONS, supra note 1, at 115.
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subjects, I have reflected on the limits of and challenges to the liberal
project of choreographing the management of life. It is here in the social
life of liberalism, its technical production and ethical cultivation, that
political contestations lie and that the site for rethinking new forms of
African governmental bodies must dwell.
What we are witnessing, then, is a radical normalization of
governance in which particular vernacular forms that once shaped the
basis for life are measurable through public spectacles of the rule of law.
These displays, narrativized as justice producing, hold power through
the creation of a theater of justice. They represent the performance of
justice through an economy of appearances that attempts to make loss
and disenfranchisement bearable. The generative significance of such
international, spectacular movements-in-the-making exists as a kind of
self-deception with far-reaching consequences. Movements to establish
judicial authority through the moral imperative to end impunity can
never quite redress the horror of loss or evade the incessant reminder
that the capture of a commander, or the deployment of command
responsibility to reassign guilt, will not end violence. The sources of
violence lie elsewhere; they lie in the banality of the everyday and its
dramatic efforts to control the terms of life and the production of death.
Underlying cycles of consumer demand also exist alongside spectacles of
war violence, but these cycles are never the object of engagement by
those concerned with the preservation of rights. Instead, it is political
rights, not economic rights that undergird the contemporary rule of law
movement.
Today's reality is that in certain African countries, economically,
politically, and socially shaped forms of violence are increasingly
managed in sites and markets outside the continent. The argument here
is that the dramatic performances of justice-making mechanisms, the
show trials, are arising elsewhere. These sites are central to making
sense of the ways that the investment in the rule of law supports a
growing industry of not only consumer goods tied to violence and the
humanitarian bandwagon to "save Africa," but also the regime of rule-
of-law making itself. The spectacular conjuring of the need for trials as
the only objective way to achieve "justice" shapes the dramatization of
the triumph of the rule of law central to a particular economy of
appearances.74 But the reality is that these adjudicatory spheres of
interactions are masked as inclusions in new international rule of law
movements and involve moral intervention in the name of victims.
These exclusions speak to the externalities of management that are
increasingly becoming technocratic and linguistically specific, and
74. Tsing, supra note 3, at 118.
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around which adherents are expected to structure their speech, claims,
criticisms, and aspirations. This performance, this theater, linked as it
is to a profoundly uneven global political economy, actually undermines
the capacity of institutional justice to ameliorate explicit forms of
material violence at play.
